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WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC REGULATION OF
AIR TRANSPORT II
A. J. THOMAS, JR.
BILATERAL Am TRANSPORT AGREEMENTS
Since there has been failure to adopt a multilateral treaty pro-
viding for the exchange of international routes and air services
by the members of the community of nations, the bilateral agree-
ment between the governments of two states has been rsorted to
in order to gain transit rights and rights to operate air trans-
port services by the airline companies of one state into the terri-
tory of the other state. These bilateral agreements have been of
either a general or specific nature although the vast majority
have fallen into the latter category.110 A general agreement sets
forth n conditions to be followed, but merely grants to the com-
mercial air carriers of each country concerned a mutual freedom
to establish and operate international air transport services. For
example, the United States-Colombian Agreement of 1929111 per-
mitted air transport operations of the United States to fly and
land along both coasts of Colombia, while Colombian air ser-
vices were granted such rights along the coasts of the United
States and in the Canal Zone. The specific agreement grants the
privilege to air carriers of each contracting nation to operate
into the territory of the other, but, in addition, sets forth
conditions and restrictions to be obeyed in the operation of
such international air services. Route designations to be fol-
lowed to and from each country are generally outlined. In
the more recent agreements the point of departure in a con-
tracting state, intermediate points, destination in the terri-
troy of the other contracting state, and points beyond are all
specified with exactness.112 At times, however, the air stops
have not been described in such detail, but it has only been
stated in the agreement that a reasonably direct route should
110. See LiSSITZYN, op. cit. supra note 19, at 379; TOMBS, op. Cit. supra
note 2, at 113.
111. State Dept. Press Release, Feb. 23, 1929, see Lissitzyn, id. at 388.
112. See, for example, the elaborate routing schedule in the Bermuda
Agreement signed between the United States and Great Britain, Treaties &
Other International Act Series 1507 (Dep't of State 1926).
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be followed between the two states.113 Some countries have re-
quired any route agreement signed to contain conditions accruing
to their own advantage as in the case of Ireland. This nation
requires that any carrier operating on an international trunk
route thruogh its territory shall make Shannon airport its first
and last European port of call."1 4 In most instances in connection
with routing arrangements reciprocal concessions or substan-
tially reciprocal concessions are made by the contracting states.
One type of agreement is that wherein strictly recriprocal rights
are granted on a designated route between the two states.1115
For example state A and state B might agree that authorized air
carriers of each state should be accorded rights of transit, non-
traffic stop, as well as the right to pick up and discharge traffic
on a route between city X in A and city Y in B; in both direc-
tions. A nation like the United States with air carriers operating
to the far corners of the globe would find such an agreement of
little value, but requires an agreement which not only permits it
to operate to a point or points within one nation but also to
points beyond, along the international trunk routes which its
airlines traverse. Therefore, a second type of air transport
agreement has emerged wherein each state grants to the air car-
riers of the other authority to conduct air transport operations
within its territory which is a part of a trunk operation beyond
its boundaries. The United States-Peruvian Agreement" 6 ex-
emplifies this type of agreement. There it is provided:
Airlines of the United States of America, designated in
conformity with the present agreement, are accorded rights
of transit and of nontraffic stop in and through the terri-
tory of the Republic of Peru as well as the right to pick up
and discharge international traffic in passengers, cargo, and
mail at Lima, Talara, Chiclayo and Arequipa on the follow-
ing routes via intermediate points in both directions: The
United States and/or the Canal Zone to Talara, Chiclayo,
Lima and Arequipa; and beyond Peru to points in Chile and
Bolivia or beyond.
Airlines of the Republic of Peru, designated in conformity
113. Interim Agreement Between the United States and Treaties and
Other International Acts Series 1576 (Dep't of State 1945).
114. Agreement Between the United States and Ireland, Executive
Agreement Series 460 (Dep't of State 1945).
115. See TOMBS, op. cit. supra note 2, at 113.
116. Agreement Between the United States and Peru, Treaties & Other
International Acts Series 1587 (Dep't of State 1946).
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with the present agreement, are accorded rights of transit
and of nontraffic stop in and through the territory of the
United States of America and in and through the Canal
Zone as well as the right to pick up and discharge interna-
tional traffic in passengers, cargo, and mail at Washington,
D. C., New York, N. Y., and the Canal Zone on the follow-
ing route via intermediate points in both directions: From
Peru via the Canal Zone and Havana, Cuba, to Washington,
D. C., and New York, N. Y.; and beyond the United States
to Montreal, Canada.21T
Again a nation may grant to the air carriers of one nation the
privilege to operate an air service to and beyond its territory on
a route while the airlines of the first nation may be extended the
privilege to fly to the other nation but not beyond its territory.
The United States Agreement with Switzerlandl8 so provides.
It reads:
Airlines of the United States of America... are accorded
rights of transit and non-traffic stop in Swiss territory, as
well as the right to pick up and to discharge international
traffic in passengers, cargo and mail at Geneva (or other
suitable airport) on the following route: The United States,
over a North Atlantic route to Ireland and thence to Paris
and Switzerland, and beyond to Italy, Greece, and the Near
and Middle East, via intermediate points; in both directions.
Airlines of Switzerland authorized under the present agree-
ment are accorded rights of transit and non-traffic stop in
the territory of the United States of America, as well as
the right to pick up and discharge international traffic in
passengers, cargo and mail at New York, on the following
route: Switzerland, via intermediate points (non traffic
stops) to New York; in both directions.'"
As to the privileges of operations over the route by the air
carriers, these, too, are of a substantially recriprocal nature, al-
though the agreement may provide for all five freedoms of the
air on the international route, or only a portion of them. Again
certain points on a route may be designated as non-traffic stops
only, while others may be designated open to all five freedoms.
Traffic limitations may be established in the agreement specify-
ing the number of frequencies to be operated or capacity allow-
able. Provisions requiring sufficient traffic stops in order to offer
reasonable commercial services for traffic to and from a con-
117. Id. at 7.
118. See note 113 supra.
119. Id. at 5.
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tracting country may be inserted, as well as provisions with
respect to tariffs, reservations of cabotage, 120 and the like.
By 1940 the United States was a party to a number of bilateral
air transport agreements with other nations,121 but many of our
operating rights along international routes were not acquired
by government to government bargaining, but rather because
of negotiations by an airline company itself with a foreign gov-
ernment through whose territory the operation was to be con-
ducted. In the pioneering days of international air transport,
Pan American Airways was encouraged by the United States
Government to negotiate agreements with various countries.
122
By this process Pan American obtained operating rights in
Latin America, in the Pacific areas, in Africa, and in Europe.
This type of direct negotiation for air transport privileges by
the air carrier concerned with a foreign nation had one advan-
tage in that the negotiating air carrier's government under the
terms of such agreement was usually not bound to grant recipro-
cal privileges or rights to the air carriers of the granting nation,
although this was not always the case, for some such private
agreements entered into were contingent upon a grant of recipro-
cal rights by the government of the negotiating company.
Disadvantageously, these private negotiations often led to a
virtual monopoly in the negotiating carrier since other flag
carriers of the same country as the negotiating carrier were
generally precluded from operating into the granting nation.
123
The pioneering days have passed, and exchanges of rights are
now, for the most part, entered into by diplomatic bargaining
between the two governments concerned. Such a procedure does
away with any question of the monopolistic appropriation of a
route by one carrier of a state, for when a government secures
operating rights it does so in general terms so that it is per-
mitted to apportion the privilege to operate into the foreign
nation to the carrier or carriers it may desire to designate. The
majority of the European nations have required that route and
operating right applications be made to them through proper
diplomatic channels at government level. The United States
120. Section 6 c of the Air Commerce Act of 1926 bars foreign air car-
riers from sabotage.
121. See LiSsrZYN, op. cit. supra note 19, at 387-395. They were made
with Colombia, Great Britain, France and Canada.
122. Ryan, supra note 78, at 447; Rhyne, supra note 6, at 298.
123. LiSSITZYN, op. cit. supra note 19, at 386.
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changed its -policy as of 1943 and requires the State Department
to secure commercial rights of air transport in general terms.
Its reasons were as follows:
1. The desire to avoid a confusing and perhaps embar-
rassing situation resulting from several carriers competing
with each other in negotiations with foreign governments or
foreign carriers.
2. The desirability of avoiding a situation whereby a
carrier which has successfully concluded such foreign nego-
tiations, was later denied a certificate by the Civil Aeronau-
tics Board on the grounds that convenience and necessity did
not justify the operation contemplated.
3. The desire to avoid the possibility of any exclusive
arrangements being negotiated by an individual carrier
which would be designed to restrict the power of selection,
of the operating carrier by the C.A.B. In the interest of
equity to all U.S. air carriers, the Board could not be in-
fluenced in the final selection of a carrier by consideration of
special or private arrangements previously concluded by
that carrier on its own initiative.24
The system of unregulated bilateralism existing between the
two World Wars was far from satisfactory. International air
services on promising international routes were prevented sim-
ply because one nation lying athwart the route would not permit
a right of transit over its territory. Too, bilateral bargaining
based on diplomatic issues brings about discriminations. A
granting state might discriminate in permitting operations by
the carriers of one state and refusing to permit operations by
the carriers of other states. Operating rights might be granted
to more than one state, but the granting state might open certain
routes and airports to some states and not to others, or place
conditions such as rate control or schedule restrictions on some
and not on others. 25 The Chicago Conference attempted to deal
with discrimination. Of course the Air Transit Agreement which
has been adopted rather widely precludes the blocking of air
transit on international routes between nations adhering
thereto. 2 6 In the field of bilateral agreements, the Chicago Con-
vention requires registration of such agreements which at least
124. C.A.B. Memorandum dated Dec. 2, 1943, to all holders of and appli-
cants for certificates of public convenience and necessity. Also see Rhyne,
supra note 6, at 299.
125. See Little, supra note 98, at 36-39; Ryan, supra note 78, at 447-448.
. 126. Air Transit Agreement, supra note 12.
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has the advantage of making such agreements public and thus
permits each state knowledge of terms granted to other states.
27
Since it was recognized that some nations would not grant air
transit rights, and a great many more would not grant trade
rights, Resolution VIII of the Chicago Conference encouraged
the following of a standard form agreement by nations grant-
ing transit and commerical rights bilaterally. In setting
forth this recommended form, those participating in the Con-
ference hoped a degree of discrimination could be ended and a
measure of uniformity in agreements between nations as to the
operations of air services to and through national territory
attained.12s
A. The Standard Form Agreement. In two recommendatory
paragraphs the Civil Aviation Conference stated that nations
should not in any bilateral agreement grant "exclusive rights
of transit, non-traffic stop, and commercial entry to any other
State or airline.'' 129 Moreover it was recommended that exclusive
and discriminating agreements by one state against the airlines
of another should not be made, and those in existence should be
terminated as soon as feasible. The clauses set forth in the
form were to become standard clauses to be incorporated in
agreements to the extent applicable, although deviations in lan-
guage in particular cases would be permitted and adidtional con-
sistent clauses allowed. The Standard Form Agreement contains
ten clauses. The form requires operating rights granted in bi-
lateral agreements to be set out in an annex. It was stated:
An annex will include a description of the routes and of the
rights granted whether of transit only, of non-traffic stops
or of commercial entry as the case may be, and the condi-
tions incidental to the granting of the rights. Where rights
of non-traffic stop or commercial rights are granted, the
Annex will include a designation of the ports of call at
which stops can be made, or at which commercial rights for
the embarkation and disembarkation of passengers, cargo
and mail are authorized, and a statement of the contracting
parties to whom the respective rights are granted.130
Insertion of clauses is called for as to the placing in operation
of air services granted by the contracting parties, and for con-
127. Art. 83 of the Chicago Convention, supra note 12.
128. Little, supra note 98, at 38; Ryan, supra note 78, at 451.
129. Standard Form of Agreement for Provisional Air Routes, Inter-
national Civil Aviation Conference, supra note 12.
130. Id. at 40, note.
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tinuation of previous operating agreements between contracting
states and non-contracting states. Clause 4 seeks to prevent dis-
criminatory practices with respect to charges for airports and
facilities, the fees and duties charged for the introduction of
fuel, lubricating oils and spare parts into the territory of con-
tracting states. Certificates of airworthiness, competency and
licenses of one contracting state are to be recognized as valid by
another. Certain laws and regulations of contracting states are
to be complied with. As to aircraft of contracting parties such
laws and regulations are to be applied without distinction as to
nationality. Conditions under which an operating agreement
may be revoked or withheld are set forth; and terms dealing
with registration of the agreement with ICAO, arbitration pro-
visiong if desired, and the duration of the agreement are in-
cluded.
After the Chicago Conference the United States signed several
bilateral agreements with other nations generally following
these standard clauses. A number of these agreements contained
reciprocal grants of all five freedoms of the air. It should be
noted that the Standard Form Agreement pertains only to the
bare essentials of agreement. It contains no clauses directed to
such basic economic problems as rate regulation or limitations
on frequency or capacity. In 1946 a changed United States policy
concerning international air transport became evident. In that
year a bilateral agreement, the Bermuda Agreement,131 was
negotiated, and in addition the United States announced its
withdrawal from the Chicago Air Transport Agreement.1 2
These two steps were indicative of a changed United States
viewpoint. Apparently former opposition to international air
transport economic controls was relaxed.
B. The Bermuda Agreement. The Bermuda Agreement is a
bilateral agreement signed by the United States and Great
Britain authorizing reciprocal air transport privileges into each
of the contracting parties' territories and incorporating therein
certain economic controls governing the air transport operations
between the two nations. The terms of the agreement go beyond
the scope of the Chicago Standard Form Bilateral Agreement
131. Air Services Agreement between the United States of America and
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Treaties and
Other International Acts Series 1507 (Dep't of State 1946).
132. See note 47, swpra.
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and are inconsistent with previous United States air transport
policy. At the Chicago Conference the United States called for
the widest possible freedom for international air transport opera-
tions and firmly opposed economic regulation. The Bermuda
plan incorporates provisions not only exchanging routes and
privileges, but also with respect to rate regulation and capacity.
The Agreement also represents a changed policy for Great
Britain for that nation abandoned former insistence on direct
international control of economic factors. 33 The agreement is of
import for since its acceptance other bilateral agreements have
used it for a model.
1. Exchange 'of Routes and Privileges. Under the Chicago Air
Transit Agreement, accepted by both the United States and
Great Britain, airlines or either nation were permitted to fly
through the airspace of the other over routes to be specified, and
to land at specified airports in the territory of the other for non-
traffic purposes only.' 4 Inasmuch as Great Britain refused to
accept the Chicago Air Transport Agreement, there was no gen-
eral grant of the privilege to pick up and discharge passengers
and cargo by United States air transport companies in Great
Britain or by British airlines in the United States. By the terms
of the Bermuda plan each nation granted to the other privileges
of trade; that is, the privilege ".... of commercial entry and de-
parture for international traffic in passengers, cargo and
mail.. .,,1 Thus all five freedoms of the air became operative as
between the two nations, although in the case of commercial
privileges certain limitations were indicated.
As contrasted with the Chicago Air Transport Agreement,
which provided for commercial privileges on a reasonably direct
route out from and back to the homeland, permitted the designa-
tion by a state of the route to be followed, and airports to be
used in that states territory, the Bermuda plan in an elaborate
route chart provides for specific definite international routes and
airports for commercial air transport services of the airlines of
the two nations, and such trading privileges are valid only at
points named and on routes indicated. The point of departure,
133. Ryan, suprm note 78, at 455; Cooper, supra note 52, at 1209; Cooper,
The Bermuda Plan: World Pattern for Air Transport, 25 FOREIGN AFFAIRS
59 (1946).
134. Air Transit Agreement, art. 1, supra note 12.
135. Bermuda Agreement, supra note 131, Annex I.
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all intermediate points, the destination in the territory of the
authorizing states and points to be served on the route beyond
are set out. The air carriers of each nation are granted routes
across the territory of the other, with the privilege to stop for
international traffic purposes at designated points within either
nation. For example, a British carrier may depart from London
on a route across the Atlantic to New York, proceed to San
Francisco and then via Honolulu, Midway, Wake, Guam, or
Manila, to Singapore or Hongkong. Again a British plane may
depart from London, fly via intermediate points to New York,
then proceed onward to New Orleans and Mexico City. To give
a reciprocal example, American carriers may fly from points in
the United States named, via intermediate points to London or
Prestwick, and then proceed to several designated northern
European cities; or on another route, after reaching London, the
United States carrier may fly on to central European cities, to
Near Eastern points, and India. The agreement then signifies
that at designated points in United States territory, a British
carrier may pick up international traffic bound to its own terri-
tory, or discharge international traffic from its own territory, as
well as pick up or discharge international traffic to or from other
'nations on the route. In turn the United States carriers can
exercise trading privileges of commercial entry and departure
in international traffic at the designated points in the territory
of Great Britain. Thus British carriers may compete not only
with American international air transport operations, but also
with internal American airlines companies, for a British carrier
may pick up and discharge international traffic on one route, for
example, at New York, at San Francisco and at American Pacific
points such as Honolulu, and carry that traffic on to Singapore
or Hongkong.1 6
2. Rates. In the international air transport field where sub-
sidies do away in part with economic principles of supply and
demand which would tend to bring about fair rates, there has
been fear of the establishment of destructive rates having no
relation to costs of operations. Hence demand has been made for
some control other than unilateral national control of interna-
tional rates. At Bermuda the United States acceded to a measure
136. Cooper, The Bermuda Plan: World Pattern for Air Transport,
supra note 133, at 63-64.
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of international regulation in its agreement with Britain. It was
there stated:
the two Goverments desire to foster and encourage
the widest distribution of the benefits of air travel for the
general good of mankind at the cheapest rates consistent
with sound economic principles. 137
These sound rates were said to be rates "fixed at reasonable
levels, due regard being paid to all relevant factors, such as cost
of operation, reasonable profit and the rates charged by any
other carriers." 138 The rates to be charged by the carriers of the
contracting parties operating between points in the United
States and Britain were made subject to the approval of the two
nations within their constitutional powers and obligations, thus
either party to the agreement may disapprove any rate proposed
by the other's carriers.
The provisons of the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 do not give
authority to the Civil Aeronautics Board to fix rates of United
States carriers operating in foreign commerce. Therefore, a
compromise solution had to be found in order to control such
rates. The Board does have the power to approve or disapprove
rate agreements when United States carriers enter into such
agreement with each other or with foreign air carriers.139 The
Civil Aeronautics Board announced that it would approve the
rate conference machinery of the International Air Transport
Association for one year, thus making any rate agreement con-
cluded through this association involving United States air
carriers subject to the Board's approval.140 The International
Air Transport Association is an organization composed of the
majority of the important air transport concerns of the world
including American. The Board, by an indirect method, asserted
authority over American international carriers by approving or
disapproving the rate making machinery or IATA of which its
carriers are members. Thus, the initial rate making function
was left to IATA.142 However, the participators in the Bermuda
Conference foresaw the possibility that the two countries might
137. Bermuda Agreement, sura note 131 at 18.
138. Id., Annex II, Paragraph (h), p. 9.
139. CIVIL AERONAUTICS ACT OF 1938, § 412 (a).
140. Bermuda Agreement, supra note 131, Annex II, Paragraph (b),
p. 7.
141. See Cooper, The Bermuda Plan, supra note 133 at 64-66; Gazdik,
Rate-Making and the IATA Traffic Conferences, 16 J. Ant L. 298 (1949).
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be unable to reach rate agreement through IATA. Too, there
was the possibility that IATA machinery might not be applica-
ble. To take care of such contingencies it was therefore provided
that when one of the contracting parties is dissatisfied with a
proposed new rate, the parties shall seek to reach an agreement.
If such agreement is reached, each contracting party will use its
best efforts to cause the agreed rate to be accepted by its carrier
or carriers. If no agreement is reached, the objecting party
"may take such steps as it may consider necessary to prevent
the inauguration or continuation of the service in question at the
rate complained of."''
42
A substitute procedure was also set forth in case IATA
machinery could not settle the disagreement. This procedure
could only be utilized after the Civil Aeronautics Board obtained
the power to fix rates,1-3 and it was stated in the agreement that
efforts would be made by United States authorities to secure
legislation empowering the Board to fix rates. So after the Board
obtains rate fixing powers, if an air carrier of a contracting
party proposes an uneconomic rate, the aeronautical authorities
of the country of that carrier shall prevent it. However, if a new
rate becomes effective and the other contracting party is dis-
satisfied, then the contracting parties shall seek to agree on an
appropriate rate. If agreement is reached each party "will exer-
cise its statutory powers to give effect to such agreement."' 44 If
no agreement is reached the rate "may, unless the aeronautical
authorities of the country of the air carrier concerned see fit to
suspend its operation, go into effect provisionally pending the
settlement of any dispute. .. ,145
In regard to settlement of disputes as to proposed or existing
rates, provision is made that, after a reasonable time and con-
sultation, either contracting party may request both to submit
the question to the International Civil Aviation Organization for
an advisory report.1' 6 Thus, it is thought to have ICAO adjudge
these disputes between the two nations, although without prec-
edent it is hard to say just how binding an advisory report
142. Bermuda Agreement, supra note 131, Annex II, Paragraph (f), p. 9.
143. The Civil Aeronautics Board has requested power from Congress
to fix rates for air carriers in foreign commerce. See Annual Report C.A.B.
1948, 13; Annual Report C.A.B. 1947, 12; Annual Report C.A.B. 1946, 12.
144. Bermuda Agreement, supra note 131, Annex II, Paragraph (e), p. 8
145. Ibid.
146. Id., paragraph (g), p. 9.
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might be on the two parties concerned. In any event interna-
tional rate control machinery has been promulgated to protect
against ruinous rate wars, and the United States has recognized
that an international authority might be empowered to fix rates
in case of disagreement-a broad concession in view of its un-
bending policy at the Chicago conference.1
47
3. Capacity. The Bermuda plan envisages no specific limitation
or designations of frequencies or capacity. Each nation is free to
decide in the first instance the capacity or number of frequencies
which will be operated. However, certain principles are stated
which apparently will provide eventual restrictions on fifth-
freedom traffic. After recognizing that the primary objective of
capacity provided shall be "to take care of" traffic demands be-
tween the home country of an air carrier and the country of
ultimate destination of the traffic (third and fourth-freedom
traffic), the Final Act declares:
The right to embark or disembark on such services inter-
national traffic destined for and coming from third coun-
tries at a point or points on the routes specified in the Annex
to the Agreement shall be applied in accordance with the
general principles of orderly development to which both
Governments subscribe and shall be subject to the general
principle that capacity should be related:
(a) to traffic requirements between the country of ori-
gin and the countries of destination;
(b) to the requirements of through airline operation;
and
(c) to the traffic requirements of the area through
which the airline passes after taking account of local
and regional services. 148
Moreover, it is stated:
That, in the operation by the air carriers of either Govern-
ment of the trunk services described in the Annex to the
Agreement, the interest of the air carriers of the other
Government shall be taken into consideration so as not to
affect unduly the services which the latter provides on all or
part of the same routes.1" 9
Hereby fifth-freedom traffic is to be limited at some future
time when there arises a necessity for airlines of one nation
operating on a trunk line to consider airlines of the other coun-
147. Cooper, The Bermuda Plan, supra note 133 at 65.
148. Bermuda Agreement, supra note 131, at 19.
149. Id. at 18.
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try, so as not to affect unduly the latter's services on the same
route; and further, fifth-freedom traffic will "depend upon the"
requirements of "through" airline operation and upon the traffic
requirements of areas concerned after due consideration of the
effects upon local and regional services. Therefore, some re-
strictions upon capacity which may be operated will be forth-
coming after a reasonable period is given to develop traffic,
since, if the air transport operations become in the opinion of
either nation "inconsistent" with the traffic principles set out in
the Final Act, such operations may become the subject of an
advisory opinion by ICAO. This would be true for it is provided
that disputes may be placed before ICAO for an advisory opinion,
and any dispute as to frequencies and capacity of operations
could thus be submitted for determination as to the measure of
compliance with the standards laid down.150 However, it must
be emphasized that such an opinion is advisory only by the terms
of the Bermuda plan and no means for enforcement are in-
cluded. 51
VI. CONCLUSION
International air transport is an instrument endowed with the
public interest of nations and, as such, is subject to all the stres-
ses and strains of national and international rivalries. Too, it
must, if at all possible, rise and prosper within the periphery of
legal rules national and international with which mankind binds
it. On an international scale, the most restrictive legal rule
upon international air transport is the doctrine of airspace sover-
eignty, and to date it stands rock-like, unimpaired. Why, it may
be asked have the nations adhered so firmly to the principle of
sovereignty over the airspace? Simply because the instrument,
air transportation, is endowed with political, economic and mili-
150. Id., art. 9, p. 4; as to frequency and capacity see Cooper, Bermuda
Plan, supra note 133, at 66-71.
151. It may be noted that the Bermuda Agreement and other bilateral
agreements concluded as executive agreements have been attacked on the
ground that such agreements should have been concluded as treaties, and
thus since they were not, abridge the United States Constitution. See
Cooper, Bermuda Plan, supra note 133, at 70-71 and Wiprud, Some Aspects
of Public International Air Law, 13 GEO. WAsH. L. Rsv. 247, at 264 et seq.(1945). The President's Air Policy Commission recommended, however, that
executive agreements are better than treaties in gathering international air
transport rights, inasmuch as the considerable delay experienced in submis-
sion of a treaty for ratification would prohibit immediate inaguration of
services as well as timely amendments caused by changing conditions.
SURVIVAL IN THE Am AGE, 119-120 (1948).
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tary elements. If the three can be separated, it appears that the
economic element supports the concept most firmly inasmuch as
many nations have seen fit to sign the Air Transit Agreement
which permits flying through superjacent airspace of states and
landing for non-traffic purposes. On the other hand, there was
little acceptance of the five freedoms agreement, which would
have permitted trading; that is, the right to take on and dis-
charge passengers and cargo. It would seem that the sover-
eignty doctrine is based primarily upon economic considerations,
each nation desiring the right to control the trading privileges
which foreign flag air transport will possess within its territory,
to place thereon a handicap similar to a tariff in order to protect
its own air transport operations if necessary. Whether this
theory is good or bad depends upon whether one is or is not a
believer in free trade. This same theory has made a resort to a
multilateral grant of complete air transport privileges untenable,
and has left the world in a state of bilateral bargaining over the
exchange of operating rights. It is significant however that the
debate has narrowed. The real problem today as to a multilateral
grant of privileges is the fifth-freedom traffic, and whether eco-
nomic regulation in the form of capacity control is to be provided
with respect thereto. As stated there has been considerable
agreement accepting the principle of transit rights for non-traffic
purposes, and the third and fourth-freedohis have in large mea-
sure been recognized as fundamental. But multilateral accord is
prevented due to the fifth-freedom controversy. The conflict has
resolved itself into one between states possessing long range air
transport operations requiring fifth-freedom privileges from
many states to conduct their through operations, and those pos-
sessing local or regional international airlines who desire pro-
tection from the long range carriers. Thus for the most part the
issue is now one as to the restriction that will be placed upon
trunk line operations in the carriage of fifth-freedom traffic in
order to protect the regional airlines of the nations along the
route. To date general terms of assent have not been found, al-
though the signing of the Bermuda Agreement by two great pow-
ers, Britain and the United States, and the emulation of this
type of bilateral agreement by other nations is a hopeful sign
that some accord for a multilateral agreement concerning air
transport operating privileges will be forthcoming. The Bermuda
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Agreement with its reciprocal grant of transit and trading priv-
ileges along specific routes with provisions for ultimate capacity
control, rate regulatory principles, and provision for the settle-
ment of disputes might well become a basis for multilateral
agreement at least between nations falling within the sphere of
western influence; although with the present world situation
divided between competing camps it is doubtful if much accord
can be reached with Russia or her satellites.
Finally it must be again stressed that the present system of
bilateralism is far from satisfactory. The grant or non-grant by
a nation of operating privileges to the air carriers of another
based upon bargaining or other considerations leads to inter-
national rivalries and tensions. Ultimately world air transport
should be placed under the control of some international body
with economic regulatory authority over the granting of operat-
ing rights, rates and unfair practices or nations and interna-
tional airlines companies. Only in such manner can controversy
and apprehension be removed from this instrument of the public
welfare. It is submitted that such a scheme is near short of im-
possible in the world of 1950. Possibly such control must await
a world government, but at most it cannot come about until a
world organization comes into being with greater strength than
that existing today.
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